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Germany, with mixed results. Despite
a relentless and costly air campaign,
the German Wehrmacht could only be
defeated on the ground. A basic concept
of strategic-bombing theory held that
heavy civilian casualties would force
enemy leaders to sue for peace, but
the theorists and practitioners did not
factor in the callous nature of despotic
leaders who cared little for the welfare
of their citizenry. (For more information on this subject see Among the Dead
Cities: The History and Moral Legacy
of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in
Germany and Japan, by A. C. Grayling.)
Japan was a different story. Arnold
envisioned unleashing the as-yetunfielded B-29 Superfortresses on
Japan en masse. The USAAF first tried
conducting operations from China, but
that proved untenable for a variety of
reasons. Eventually airfields on Guam,
Saipan, and Tinian, islands that were
taken at great cost, came into existence for sustained B-29 operations.
The air war against Japan was much
more than the story of B-29 raids on
Tokyo and other targets. One littleknown operation went under the dark
moniker of Operation STARVATION, the
deployment of aerial mines by B-29s.
These sorties proved quite effective
in whittling down Japan’s merchant
marine, thus devastating Japan’s morale
and eroding its capability for war production. USAAF crews delivered twelve
thousand mines, sinking 293 ships
between March and April 1945. Yet for
all the successes that the United States
had in the skies over Japan, the USAAF
and U.S. Navy cooperated little in the
planning and implementation of the
overall campaign. Each service pursued
its own air operations, the Army going
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after Japan’s cities and the Navy after
Japan’s fleet and coastal shipping.
Tillman’s excellent book is well researched and well written. He reintroduces the reader to the pivotal leaders
who played a role in the execution of
the air war on Japan. He rounds out
his narrative with accounts from B-29
aircrews and naval aviators who flew at
the tip of the spear aimed at Japan; their
observations and recollections add an
excellent sense of humanity to the story.
His account also serves to validate joint
operations, a lesson borne out by the
experience of this war and one that our
military continues to observe today.
This book will not end the debate on the
value and moral justification of the U.S.
air war on Japan. Tillman clearly makes
the point that while the air war against
Japan did not end the conflict on its
own, it did affect Japan’s ability to continue to wage war. In the end it is clear
that Japan was willing to fight despite
the destruction of its cities and that it
was preparing mightily for the expected
invasion of the home islands. However,
it was the atomic attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki that finally forced Japan
to seek peace and end the slaughter.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE

San Diego, California
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This is an exceptional book. Although
it has its share of strategy, logistics,
and technology, it is primarily a book
about relationships and leadership.
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In what is ostensibly a triple biography, George S. Patton, Jr., and Omar
Bradley get their fair share of attention, but in the end it is Dwight David
Eisenhower who dominates the pages.
Jordan has produced what is in many
ways a paragon of modern biographies.
The darker sides of his subjects are
not overlooked or glossed over, as in
E. B. Potter’s Bull Halsey, nor does the
book descend into the merely salacious
and prurient, as sometimes occurs in
Evan Thomas’s Sea of Thunder. Jordan
paints pictures of whole men, and
with remarkable fidelity. Meticulously
researched, this work neither shies away
from nor lingers on the flaws each man
possessed. For example Patton’s philandering and alcohol abuse in the 1930s
are reasonably depicted as characteristic
of an ambitious warrior trapped in a
peacetime army, bored, restless, and desperately worried that his moment had
come and gone. Likewise, Eisenhower’s
relationship with Kay Summersby is
addressed directly. The relationship was
inappropriate and, from a security point
of view, reckless. Bradley worried about
this, as did Marshall and members of
Eisenhower’s personal staff. However,
Jordan concludes that Eisenhower
needed Kay to maintain some sense of
stability in his life and that whatever
degree of infidelity it entailed was compensated by Ike’s resulting performance.
Jordan also discusses in detail the
episode in which Eisenhower reached
a point where he was willing to force
his superiors to fire either Montgomery
or him. This was an example of superb
political acumen and the use of power.
Jordan documents Patton’s remarkable
churlishness and childishness, as well as
his extraordinary drive and sense of the
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operational moment. Jordan displays
both a keen understanding of and sympathy for the flamboyant Patton, just as
he does with Eisenhower. With Bradley,
however, Jordan is just a touch less surefooted, perhaps because Bradley was by
nature a more private man. Yet for all
that, there are few passages more moving and superbly depicted than those
describing Bradley’s reaction when, during the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower
took the First and Ninth Armies and
assigned them to Montgomery. Bradley’s rage and hurt were only magnified when his threat of resignation was
ignored. However, his rage was nothing
compared to the mean-spiritedness of
Patton, who, removed from command,
savaged in his diary his boss and former
friend, alleging that Eisenhower suffered
from moral turpitude and cowardice.
Because Jordan understands the nature
of these men’s relationships, he is able
to convey the tragedy that accompanied
them. Above all, he documents with
marked sympathy the forging and the
gradual undoing of the EisenhowerPatton friendship, as much a casualty of
Patton’s selfishness and lack of empathy as the inevitable consequence of
friends occupying different levels of
command responsibility. The friendship between Eisenhower and General Bradley was equally damaged but
much more rapidly, stemming from
what Bradley felt was a betrayal.
These friendships would in time be, if
not fully repaired, reconciled. Eisenhower, following the death of Patton,
focused more and more on his late
friend’s sterling qualities. Perhaps
this was easier in Patton’s absence.
Paradoxically, when Patton’s reputation had threatened to eclipse those
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of other generals, Eisenhower went
out of his way to laud Bradley as the
“best combat general of the war.”
Although the troika holds center stage,
Jordan looks at other relationships these
men had. The central role of George
Marshall is explored, along with that
which Bedell Smith played in supporting Eisenhower. Junior combat
commanders such as Lucian Truscott
and Mark Clark are given their due.
If all this book delivered were a
deeper understanding of these three
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iconic military figures, it would be
well worth the read, but it provides
much more. For, in addition to revealing the human side of three generals,
it also compares and contrasts their
very different leadership styles and
methods. Although understated, this
comparison elevates the book even
further and makes it a must-have for
any shelf of serious leadership texts.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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